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EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 10(b)
AND RULE lOb-5
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been a general rule of statutory construction that, since Con-
gress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions, federal legislation
will be presumed to apply only within the territorial limits of the United
States, absent a dear expression of contrary intent.' This territorial pre-
sumption presented a significant obstacle to American investors defrauded
in international securities transactions when, in the early 1960's, rthey first
began seeking redress for their injuries under federal law. The courts initial-
ly found nothing in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,2 or in its legis-
lative history, to suggest that the statute was designed to apply outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.3 As a result, the highly effective
anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Act4 and rule lob-55 were thought
to be available only to investors defrauded in transactions conducted within
the territorial limits of this country.
But as international activity in the securities market began to increase
sharply toward the end of the last decade, it became increasingly apparent
that limitation of the Act to a strict territorial application would considerably
dilute the protection that its anti-fraud provisions had traditionally af-
forded the American investor. It was essentially this kind of policy con-
sideration that prompted the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to recognize, in the landmark case of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
certain circumstances in which a clear congressional intent to protect Amer-
ican investors was sufficient to rebut the presumption of territoriality and
to require extraterritorial application of the Act.
The Schoenbaum decision was an important first step in expanding the
jurisdiction of United States courts over foreign securities frauds affecting
American investors. But it was only a first step, and the court's opinion left
considerable doubt as to whether the territorial presumption had been elimi-
nated or merely restricted. Nonetheless, as recent developments in the case
law indicate, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been sur-
1Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932). See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), giving extraterritorial
application to federal patent law only after finding sufficient congressional intent to rebut the
presumption of territoriality.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
3 Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. I REP. 5 91,615
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
415 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to its authority under the Act.
6405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), ree'g 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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prisingly successful in urging a broad interpretation of Schoenbaum. It will
be the purpose of this note to examine these recent developments, beginning
with Schoenbaum, and to assess the present extraterritorial applicability of
§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
II. THE SCHOENBAUM CASE
In Schoenbaum an American stockholder in a Canadian corporation,
Banff Oil Limited (Banff), brought a derivative action against certain in-
siders and controlling shareholders of the corporation, alleging violations of
§ 10(b)7 and Rule 10b-5. 8 The complaint charged that the defendants, act-
ing on "inside information" concerning recent oil discoveries by Banff, had
issued to themselves vast amounts of the corporation's treasury stock at a
price far below its fair market value. The plaintiff conceded that the sale
had been transacted wholly within the territorial limits of Canada, but con-
tended that United States courts had jurisdiction since Banff's stock was listed
on the American Stock Exchange and traded by American investors. The
district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.9
The district court felt that the alleged fraud had nothing to do with
those Banff shares traded on the American Exchange and thus provided no
substantial nexus between the United States and the suspect transaction."
What the plaintiff was really seeking, in the court's view, was extraterritorial
application of federal securities laws. But the court followed what it con-
sidere'd to be the settled rule, that the 1934 Act applied only to transactions
withiin the territorial limits of the United States. The court also found that
7 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
8 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality pf interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). A thorough treatment of this important rule and its place in
modern federal securities law can be found in A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIES LAw: FRAUD-SEC
RULE lob-5 (1967).
9 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court also failed to
find any violation of rule lob-5 in the plaintiff's allegations, even assuming that the rule did have
extraterritorial application.
'o Id. at 391.
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the traditional presumption of territoriality was reinforced by the "specific
mandate" of § 30(b) of the Act," which provides that the Act does not
apply "to any person in so far as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States . 1.. .""
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court had
erred in its refusal to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter."3 The
court of appeals undertook a close scrutinization of § 30(b)' 4 and con-
cluded that this provision was not, as the district court had thought, in-
tended to preclude extraterritorial application of the Act to any foreign
transaction whatsoever. Rather, the statute quite specifically applies only
to persons transacting a business in securities, that is, brokers, dealers and
banks. If Congress had intended to exempt every transaction by any per-
son outside of the United States it could have done so, but no such intention
should be presumed from an exemption specifically limited to foreign busi-
iness in securities.' 5
In an ingenious, if somewhat contrived, construction of the provision,
the court even managed to find in § 30(b) a kind of affirmative mandate for
extraterritorial application of the Act:
We find that the language and purpose of § 30(b) show that it was
not meant to exempt transactions that are conducted outside the jurisdic-
tion of the United States unless they are part of a "business in securities."
Indeed, since Congress found it necessary to draft an exemptive provision
for certain foreign transactions and gave the Commission power to make
rules that would limit this exemption, the presumption must be that the
Act was meant to apply to those foreign transactions not specifically ex-
empted.16
In contrast to those courts which had previously considered the ques-
tion,'7 the appeals court in Schoenbaum found no reason to assume that Con-
gress had intended the Act to apply only to transactions within the territorial
limits of the United States. The court noted that the Act has as its primary
115 U.s.C. § 78dd(b) (1970).
12Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. at 392.
13405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). The appeals court did, however, agree with the court be-
low that plaintiff had failed to state a claim under rule 10b-5. Upon rehearing this holding
was partially reversed, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
14 The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not ap-
ply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction
of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to pre-
vent the evasion of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970).
15 405 F.2d at 207-08.
16 Id. at 208. For an analysis of the court's treatment of § 30(b), see Goldman & Magrino,
Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1033-36 (1969); 1 L. POL INT.
Bus. 168, 171-73 (1969).
17 Cases cited note 3 supra.
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goal the protection of a "national public interest""' in securities regulation
and argued that the territorial presumption should not be applied so as to
frustrate a dear C.ongressional intent "to protect domestic investors who
have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transac-
tions in American securities."' 9
The district court in Schoenbaum had been reluctant to interfere with
what it viewed as an essentially Canadian transaction, involving almost ex-
clusively Canadian conduct. The appeals court, on the other hand, took a
different approach to the transaction, shifting the focus from conduct to
effect. True, the allegedly fraudulent acts had been committed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but they were intended to and
did have detrimental effects within this country.20 Consequently, the court
concluded that the anti-fraud provision of § 10(b) "reaches beyond the
territorial limits of the United States and applies when a violation of the
[SEC] Rules is injurious to United States investors."21
Prior to Schoenbaum, courts had required "some necessary and substan-
tial act within the United States" before assuming subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the Act.' But at least one court had found this requirement little
more than a useful fiction whereby jurisdiction could be assumed over an
essentially foreign transaction without having to apply rule 10b-5 "extra-
territorially."3 In Schoenbaum the court chose to discard the fiction and
confront the problem of extraterritoriality:
We hold that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over vio-
lations of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which are
alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least
when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national se-
curities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American inves-
tors.2 4
Schoenbaum, then, managed at least to cut into the presumption against
extraterritoriality. But it is not dear from the language of the holding that
1815 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
19 405 F.2d at 206.
20 There is authority in this country to support the assertion of jurisdiction under these cir-
cumstances: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 18 (1965); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See also Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 94, 95-99 (1969).
21405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis supplied).
22 Kookv. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The same test was applied
in Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2 3 SEC v. Gulf Int'l. Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). Canadian news-
papers, circulated in Florida for the benefit of Canadian tourists, carried an offer of Canadian
securities extended to all interested parties. The court held that such conduct constituted an
act within this country sufficient to support jurisdiction.
24 405 F.2d at 208.
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the court meant to eliminate the presumption entirely. The court stated
that extraterritorial application of the Act is proper to at least those transac-
tions which involve stock listed on a national exchange. Is listing on an
American exchange to be taken as the sine qua non required for extraterri-
torial jurisdiction? Or is it only one means of determining when application
of the Act to foreign transactions is proper? If so, what other circumstances
will support extraterritorial application of American securities laws? These
and other questions the court left open for later development. And that
development was not long in coming.
III. THE RECENT CASES
One of the most troublesome questions left unanswered by the Schoen-
baum decision was whether extraterritorial application of § 10(b) and rule
10b-5 can ever be justified when the alleged violation does not involve se-
curities traded on a domestic exchange. The defendants in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell2' took the position that it cannot.
In this case the plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as Leasco)
alleged that the defendants had conspired to cause Leasco to buy stock of
Pergamon Press Limited (Pergamon) at prices in excess of its true value,
in violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Pergamon was a British corpora-
tion, owned and controlled by defendant Maxwell, a British citizen. Its
stock was not traded in any United States market, nor was it listed on any
domestic exchange.
According to the complaint the defendants had induced Leasco, through
false and fraudulent information, to contract for the purchase of all Perga-
mon's outstanding stock. Although the actual purchase and sale was
transacted on the London Stock Exchange through a foreign subsidiary of
Leasco, the American plaintiffs alleged that the contract had been signed
and at least partially negotiated in New York. Moreover, the plaintiffs
claimed that sufficient misrepresentations had been made in this country,
through telephone conversations and the mail, to bring the transaction
within the jurisdictional requirements of § 27 of the Act.26
25 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g in part, rev'g in part [1971-1972 Transfer Binder)
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 93,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). This section reads, in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of Colum-
bia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the juris-
diction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title
or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein
any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to en-
force any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations thereunder, or
to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regulations, may be brought in any
such district or in the district where the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
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The defendants argued that the Exchange Act does not cover transac-
tions on foreign exchanges, between foreigners, involving foreign securities
not traded in any domestic market. But the district court, in holding that
it did have jurisdiction over the dispute, pointed out that the instant trans-
action was not really between foreigners, inasmuch as Leasco's foreign sub-
sidiary had acted simply as a conduit for Leasco in purchasing the stocky
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that Schoenbaum re-
stricted extraterritorial application of the Act to (1) foreign securities
traded domestically or (2) foreign transactions in American securities
which affect the domestic securities market.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's assertion of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and agreed that the listing of foreign
securities on a domestic exchange is not essential for extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Act.28 With respect to domestic securities transactions, it has
long been settled that the broad anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) and rule
lob-5 are not limited to securities traded on the nation's organized securi-
ties markets.9 Thus, concluded the court, there is no reason to assume that
extraterritorial application of the Act should hinge on the question of
whether the securities involved were registered with a national exchange:
Since Congress thus meant § 10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale
or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized
United States markets, we cannot perceive any reason why it should have
wished to limit the protection to securities of American issuers. The New
Yorker who is the object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New York
is as much injured if the securities are of a mine in Saskatchewan as in
Nevada.30
The court was, however, unwilling to say that a detrimental impact on
American investors is, in itself, sufficient grounds for asserting jurisdiction
over an essentially foreign transaction. To begin with, as the court recog-
nized, such a sweeping application of the Act might raise some delicate
questions of international law.3' And even if it did not, the language of
§ 10(b) is, the court felt, "much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that
Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct throughout the world
in every instance where an American company bought or sold a security." 2
2 7 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, [1971-1972 Transfer.Binder) CCH FEI.
SEc. L. REP. 5 93,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
28468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
29See L LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1466-67 (2d ed. 1961), and cases cited therein.
30 468 F.2d at 1336.
31 Id. at 1333-34. Few countries other than the United States have given enthusiastic rec-
ognition to a state's power to regulate conduct which occurs outside its territory but produces
effects within it. See Riedweg, The Exfia-territorial Application of Restrictive Trade Regila-
tion--Jurisdiction and International & w, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONPERENCE 357
(International Law Association, 1964); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 69 COLLJM. L REV. 94, 95-96 (1969).
32 468 F.2d at 1334.
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It is clear that the court in Leasco, like the court in Schoenbaum, was
reluctant to abandon outright the presumption of territoriality. It declined
to assume jurisdiction upon the mere allegation of harm to an American
investor; some further nexus had to be found. The court took its cue from
pre-Schoenbaum cases33 and looked for some conduct within the United
States. The complaint alleged that the defendants had made false state-
ments concerning Pergamon's financial condition during meetings with the
plaintiffs in New York. Telephone calls had been made, and mail sent,
in which further misinformation had been transmitted to the plaintiffs in
this country. The actual contract for sale of the securities had been signed
in New York. Here, then, was the domestic activity which the court
needed to circumvent the territorial presumption:
Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient from the stand-
point of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule. It follows that when, as here,
there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot
properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the dearest
language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond the
limits recognized by foreign relations law. Defendants' reliance on the
principle . . . that regulatory statutes will generally not be construed as
applying to conduct wholly outside the United States, is thus misplaced.3
However, in holding that conduct within the United States is sufficient
to warrant application of § 10(b) to essentially foreign transactions, the
court somewhat surprisingly concluded that it saw "no reason why, for
purposes of ...[a jurisdictional rule], making telephone calls and send-
ing mail to the United States should not be deemed to constitute conduct
within it." 5 Of course, use of the mails or some other instrumentality of
interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite of § 10(b) itself.30
Where this requirement is lacking no transaction, foreign or domestic, can
even be violative of the Act. Thus it had generally been thought that the
question of extraterritorial application should be separated from the ques-
tion of the interstate commerce requirement." Saying that use of the mails
33 See cases cited in notes 22 and 23 supra, and accompanying text.
34468 F.2d at 1334.
351d. at 1335.
36 See note 7 supra.
3 7 The court in Schoenbaum, for instance, was careful to make this distinction:
The trial court found that the transactions in question were essentially Canadian, with
insufficient [domestic] contacts ... to fall within § 10(b) of the Act. We are un-
certain whether the Court's finding was directed at the issues of extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Exchange Act or at the jurisdictional requirements of § 10....
The present question is not whether this limited use of the mails and the facilities
of interstate conmerce would be a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction over
a foreign transaction which would otherwise be exempt from the Act... but whether,
once it has been determined that the Act applies to a particular foreign transaction,
there is a use of the mails or interstate commerce sufficient to meet the requirement
of § 10(b).
405 F.2d at 210.
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is conduct within this country sufficient to support extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Act is tantamount to saying that any foreign transaction which
in fact violates § 10(b) is within the jurisdiction of United States courts,
at least when, as in Leasco, the transaction involves some injury to Ameri-
can investors. At any rate, this approach should significantly expand the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States courts with respect to § 10(b)
and rule lob-5.
The effect of the territorial presumption was further limited in another
important case, Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,38 decided shortly after
Leasco. This case involved a tender offer made by Molson Industries
Limited (Molson), a Canadian corporation, to the Canadian stockholders
of Anthes Imperial Limited (Anthes), another Canadian corporation, for
the purpose of merging Anthes into Molson. Plaintiffs, who were Ameri-
can shareholders in Anthes, alleged that the defendant Canadian corpora-
tions had, through various communications transmitted by mail and facili-
ties of interstate commerce, led the plaintiffs to believe that if they retained
their stock until after the expiration of the tender offer to the Canadian
shareholders, an equivalent offer would be made to them and other Ameri-
can shareholders. Later, however, the defendants advised that no separate
offer would be made, and threatened to withdraw market support for the
stock unless plaintiffs sold their shares to Molson. Acceding to this pres-
sure, the plaintiffs sold their stock for allegedly $1,000,000 less than they
would have realized had they sold at the time of the tender offer. Plain-
tiffs charged the defendants with fraud and self-dealing in violation of
§ 10(b) and rule lob-5.
The district court was immediately troubled by the fact that "the transac-
tions complained of involve two Canadian corporations, Canadian residents
(except two individual defendants) and a tender offer made solely in
Canada respecting shares not registered on any American exchange." 9
The court was convinced that Schoenbaum had limited extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Act to only those situations in which: (1) a domestic pur-
chaser buys foreign securities on an American exchange, or (2) an im-
proper foreign transaction in American securities affects the domestic se-
curities market.40 Obviously, Travis involved neither of these situations.
Nor was the court able to find sufficient conduct within the United
States to warrant application of the Act to an essentially foreign transac-
tion. The only contacts which the defendants were alleged to have had
with the United States involved their use of the mails and interstate com-
3 8 CCH Fit. SEC L. REP. 5 93, 718 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC L REP. 5 93,303 (B.D. Mo. 1971).
29 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 93,303 at 91,679 (E.D. Mo.
1971). Note that the district court's opinion was handed down before the Second Circuit's
decision in Leasco.
40 Id. at 91,680 (emphasis by the court).
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merce facilities to transmit communications from the defendants in Canada
to the plaintiffs in Missouri. Moreover, the court found that several of
these communications contained no misinformation at all and that those
which did had been initiated by the plaintiffs. As a result, the court con-
cluded that the defendants' letters and telephone calls were "not such
necessary and substantial acts within the United States in connection with
the alleged violation as to give this Court jurisdiction over a foreign trans-
action." 41
The Eight Circuit, relying heavily on Leasco, reversed on appeal. 2
The appeals court, to begin with, reaffirmed Leasco's position that Schoen-
baum should not be read as limiting the extraterritorial application of the
Act to transactions involving stock listed on an American exchange:
We are not persuaded that the Second Circuit intended, in Schoenbaum,
to set forth the exclusive circumstances in which extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Act is proper. The facts in Schoenbaum required only that the
court decide whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied to a
foreign transaction in foreign securities which were registered and listed
on an American exchange. The court was not required to decide whether
the Act would apply to a foreign transaction in foreign securities which
had never been registered or listed on an American exchange when a num-
ber of significant elements of the fraudulent scheme took place in the
United StatesA
Here, as in Leasco, the crucial question to be answered in determining
the applicability of the Act to foreign transactions was whether the de-
fendants' conduct within this country was sufficient to subject them to the
jurisdiction of United States courts. The district court had answered that
question in the negative; the court of appeals disagreed. The written and
telephone communications of the defendants were, in the view of the ap-
peals court, "essential elements in a slowly unfolding scheme to defraud
the plaintiffs involving the use of the mails and instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce."
44
The court was also satisfied that the requisite use of interstate com-
merce had been shown with respect to the charges of self-dealing on the
part of the defendants. But, the court observed, even'if it were assumed
that all such dealings took place in Canada, § 10 (b) and rule lob-5 would
still be applicable, since the law is well settled that "any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends." 45
411d. at 91,681. The court also found subject matter jurisdiction lacking for another rea-
son unrelated to this discussion.
42 CCH En. SEC. L. REP. 5 93, 718 (8th Cir. 1973).
43 Id. at p. 93,180 n.14.
44Id. at p. 93,182.
45ld. at p. 93,184, quoting from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
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Strictly speaking, the court is obviously incorrect about the applicability
of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to conduct, such as self-dealing, which occurs
entirely outside the borders of this country, since the requisite use of the
mails or interstate commerce would be lacking. Nevertheless, the court's
focus upon the domestic impact of foreign transactions provides an impor-
tant policy justification for extraterritorial application of the Act. If the
purpose of the Act is, as the Second Circuit argued in Schoenbaum, to pro-
tect American investors, it would be futile for a court in this country to
assume jurisdiction over a foreign transaction that had no effect at all on
American investors merely because some incidental use had been made of
the mails or of interstate commerce facilities.
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE "NEW"
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
One of the most intriguing questions remaining in the wake of Travis
and Leasco is whether use of the mails or interstate commerce facilities is,
in itself, a sufficient basis for extraterritorial application of federal se-
curities laws. The argument, which is not without some cogency, may
be framed in syllogistic fashion: Jurisdiction over foreign securities trans-
actions is proper whenever such transactions involve conduct within this
country. The use of interstate commerce facilities constitutes conduct
within this country. Therefore, jurisdiction over foreign securities trans-
actions is proper whenever such transactions involve use of interstate com-
merce facilities. It seems dear that if this argument were accepted, courts
in this country would have jurisdiction over any transaction, anywhere in
the world, which in fact violated § 10(b) or rule lob-5, since the viola-
tion of either provision requires some use of the mails or interstate com-
merce facilities.
In a recent Ninth Circuit case,4 the SEC took essentially this same po-
sition, arguing that the use of interstate commerce facilities was, in itself,
sufficient to trigger the application of federal securities laws to foreign
transactions, irrespective of whether such use was "essential or even ef-
fective in the execution of the scheme."4 7 However, the court in that case,
while upholding its jurisdiction over the activities of certain offshore
mutual funds on other grounds, specifically declined to rule on the SEC's
"interstate commerce facilities use" argument, stating that it was unneces-
sary to the court's decision.48
The court's instincts were probably sound in resisting the temptation
416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). The principle is developed in RESTATEMENT (SEooND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
46 SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 93,747 (9th Cir. 1973).
47 Brief for SEC at 42, SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5
93,747 (9th Cir. 1973).
48 CCH FED. S c. L. REP. 5 93, 747 at 93,267.
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to assert jurisdiction in that case merely on the basis of the defendants' use
of interstate commerce facilities. For while it is true that the emphasis
since Schoenbaum has been shifting to domestic conduct as the principal
basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction under § 10(b) and rule
10b-5, it would also seem to be true that the impact of foreign transactions
on American investment interests is still an important auxiliary considera-
tion in determining the propriety of such jurisdiction. As has already been
pointed out, the court in Travis took careful note of the domestic conse-
quences brought about by the foreign defendants' self-dealing.49 And in
Leasco it was the domestic impact of the defendants' fraudulent misrepre-
sentations which "tipped the scales in favor of applicability" after conduct
within the United States had already been established."
Indeed, it could prove to be a serious mistake for United States courts
to assert jurisdiction over every foreign securities transaction which in-
volves some conduct within this country, especially when that conduct
involves only an incidental use of the mails or interstate commerce facili-
ties. It must be remembered that any foreign transaction subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts will also be subject to the jurisdiction of courts
in the country where the transaction took place. At least to the extent that
United States law makes illegal conduct which is legal in the country
where it occurs, courts of this country ought to use some discretion in as-
serting jurisdiction over transactions which may be technically within their
reach.5 Certainly jurisdiction would be best declined when the transac-
tion involved had little or no detrimental impact on American investors.
This position would seem to receive some support from § 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which provides in the
relevant part:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part
of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good
faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light
of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states. .... 52
The comments to § 40 further note that "Vital national interest is not it-
self a basis of jurisdiction but is a factor favoring the exercise of jurisdic-
tion, even though it interferes with such exercise by another state. ' 53
49 CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 93,718 at 93,184.
50468 F.2d at 1337.
51 For a discussion of this problem as it applies to a related area of the law, see Oliver,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Legislation Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade
Practices, 51 AM. J. INT. L. 380 (1957).
52REsrATmENME (SEcoND) ot' FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
40 at 116 (1965).
53Id., Comment b at 117 (1965).
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The concept of vital national interest has clear application to the fed-
eral securities laws, which specifically purport to affect a "national public
interest."' But it is questionable whether every foreign transaction which
may involve some use of interstate commerce facilities should automatical-
ly be deemed to affect a "vital national interest." The comments to § 40
of the Restatement define that term as "an interest such as national security
or general welfare to which a state attaches overriding importance."' 5
Since Congress has clearly attached overriding importance to the protection
of American investors from fraudulent securities transactions, there is no
reason to suspect that it did not intend extraterritorial application of the
laws necessary to insure such protection. Conversely, however, when the
impact of a foreign transaction on American investors is trifling or in-
significant, it would seem to serve no vital national interest for courts in
this country to assert jurisdiction merely on the basis of some incidental use
of the mails or interstate commerce.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that subject matter jurisdiction would now seem rela-
tively easy to establish, it is not altogether true that there are no remaining
restrictions on the, extraterritorial application of § 10(b) and rule lob-5.
For one thing, merely because a court can establish jurisdiction over a given
foreign securities transaction, it does not necessarily follow that the court
automatically has jurisdiction over all of the actors involved in that trans-
action. It is well settled that due process requires sufficiently "affiliating
circumstances" with this country on the part of each defendant before per-
sonal jurisdiction can attach. 6 The court in Leasco, for instance, dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction the British accounting firm which had cer-
tified the defendant Pergamon's fraudulent public financial statements.
The court held that it would not be consonant with due process require-
ments that "accountants operating solely in London could be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in any country whose citizen had purchased stock of
a company they had audited....
One other limiting factor that deserves attention from the courts in
cases such as these is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Sec-
ond Circuit apparently found this doctrine an insignificant obstacle to the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Leasco, citing authority to the
effect that:
[C]ourts should require positive evidence of unusually extreme circum-
stances, and should be thoroughly convinced that material injustice is man-
54 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
5 5 RsrATEMENT (SECoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
40, Comment b at 117 (1965) (emphasis supplied),
5 6 Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
57 468 F.2d at 1342.
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ifest before exercising any such discretion to deny a citizen access to the
courts of this country.5a
Nonetheless, the doctrine could provide a useful rationale for courts which
are convinced that, although a foreign transaction may be technically with-
in their reach, policy considerations, such as a minimal impact on American
investors, militate against the exercise of jurisdiction.
Apart from these limitations, there seems to be little question that the
presumption against extraterritorial application has little, if any, remain-
ing vitality with respect to § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. And, at least when
the requisite use has been made of the mails or other facilities of inter-
state commerce, courts in this country should have few problems in assert-
ing jurisdiction over any foreign securities transaction which involves some
detrimental impact on American investors.
John F. Zimmerman, Jr.
58M. at 1344, quoting from Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955).
* Editorial associate, Richard W. Avery.
